Abstract-We use staggered banking deregulation across states in the United States to examine the impact of the resulting increased credit supply on college enrollment from the 1970s to the early 1990s. Our research design produces estimates that are not confounded by wealth effects due to changes in income or housing wealth. We find that lifting banking restrictions raises college enrollment by about 2.6 percentage points (4.9%). We rule out alternative interpretations by examining results for different income groups and bankrupt households. We also find similar effects for two-year or fouryear college completion and supporting evidence in household educational borrowing.
I. Introduction
H UMAN capital is the ultimate force that drives technological innovation and economic development, and postsecondary education plays a crucial role in fostering human capital accumulation. With an increasing wage gap between college-and noncollege-educated workers, enrollment in postsecondary educational institutions affects social mobility and the distribution of income. Economists have long recognized that credit constraints, a particular form of frictions resulting from incomplete markets, could affect an individual's investment in human capital by distorting incentives and limiting the ability to invest in education. 1 Analyzing the effect of credit constraints on the demand for higher education has presented substantial empirical challenges. While there is clear evidence that family income is strongly correlated with college enrollment in the United States, this fact is also consistent with children from lowincome families having long-term educational disadvantages because they may attend lower-quality primary and secondary schools and have access to fewer educational resources. Furthermore, earlier work that attempts to identify the effects of credit constraints is often confounded by the presence of wealth effects. For example, if education is a consumption good, then wealthier families may increase college enrollment for reasons unrelated to credit access.many existing studies have focused on student aid, family income, or wealth, our paper complements the current literature by considering another form of financial resources available to households: credit from commercial banks. Several recent studies have highlighted the importance of federal aid and loans on college enrollment. Brown, Scholz, and Seshadri (2011) find that financial aid increases the educational attainment of children whose families would typically underinvest in education. Bettinger et al. (2012) also find that assistance in filling out applications for federal student aid and loans increases college enrollment. Bound and Turner (2002) find evidence that the GI bill, which financed college education for returning soldiers, increased college enrollment for veterans substantially. Relaxing liquidity constraints for parents is fundamentally different from grant aid, as it does not involve a subsidy. Increasing subsidies may result in low-ability students' enrolling and dropping out of college (see Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2011) . However, when liquidity constraints are relaxed as a result of increased credit, funds are not given directly to students who enroll in college. Rather, unconstrained students are able to determine whether education investments are sensible given their abilities.
While direct private student loans from banks to students were virtually nonexistent before 1996, private borrowing has been and continues to be a significant means of financing postsecondary education through parental contributions to their children's tuition and living expenses. 2 In the United States, several channels of support are available to relieve the financial burden of college education for families. 3 It is important to note that these loans or aid programs have various caps and restrictions. As a result, many families turn to the private market after exhausting the limits. Families with good credit scores might also find it cheaper to borrow on the private market. During the period of financial deregulation, a significant portion of college students relied on private loans for the gap between college costs and financial resources available from grants and their families. Choy, Henke, and Schmitt (1992) document that between 1986 and 1987, 63% of students were financially dependent on their parents and 14% of students had parents using loans to provide support. In particular, 11% of students' parents took nonfederal, nonstate, or noninstitutional loans (i.e., private loans) such as signature loans, home equity loans, lines of credit, or loans against life insurance policies. Stiglitz et al. (2000) also note that 7% of families took out a second mortgage to finance college in 1993.
The staggered deregulation of the banking industry across states in the United States provides a natural setting for identifying the effect of credit constraints on the demand for college education. From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, most states deregulated the banking industry by allowing banks to open branches within and across state borders. As Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) argued, states did not deregulate their banks in anticipation of future good growth prospects. Krozner and Strahan (1999) provide a detailed analysis of the economic and political reasons for the exact timing of state branching deregulations. We therefore exploit the cross-state, cross-time exogenous variations in credit available to households from banking deregulation to examine the causal impact of credit constraints on individual-level college enrollment decisions.
Following Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , several studies have documented that bank branch deregulation leads to an improvement in the efficiency of the banking industry. Dick and Lehnert (2010) find that deregulation increased competition among lenders, allowing previously excluded households to enter the market and receive loans. We argue that households residing in states that deregulated the banking industry benefited from increased credit supply and were more likely to send their children to college. We use data from the Federal Housing Finance Association (FHFA) and Federal Reserve to show that banking deregulation was accompanied by higher loan volume, lower bank fees, and lower mortgage loan interest rates. In order to provide direct evidence on the effect of loans for college enrollment, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979. Our results indicate that the deregulation led to a significant increase in the use of loans to finance college.
We test for the empirical significance of deregulation on college enrollment with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and find that college enrollment and completion increase significantly in response to an increase in available credit after the banking deregulation. 4 Using both microdata and state-level aggregates, we estimate that college enrollment increased by roughly 2.6 percentage points (4.9%) following the lifting of branching restrictions, out of an average college enrollment rate of 53 percentage points in our sample. The access to increased credit following the branch deregulation accounts for a quarter of the total increase in college enrollments between 1972 and 1992. This result is robust to a number of alternative specifications and controls, including changes in the state-level college wage premium. We find a similar effect for college completion, with two-and four-year college completion increasing following the branching deregulation. Among all potential 4 We also present results from NLSY 79, which are of similar magnitude.
interpretations of this causal effect, we argue that the increase in college enrollment following the branching deregulation is due to the relaxation of credit constraints rather than an increase in expected return to college education from state-level financial development. Consistent with a credit constraints interpretation, the observed effect is largest among lower-and middle-income families. We observe statistically insignificant and close to 0 in magnitude effects of branching deregulation for upper-income families, while the college enrollment rates for these households increased from 56% to 64% in our sample period. As a placebo test, we also examine a group of households excluded from private credit markets due to parents' having gone through bankruptcy. Our finding that there is no significant effect for this group of households again points toward a credit constraints interpretation rather than a returns-to-education interpretation. These empirical findings are consistent with credit constraints being the primary mechanism through which this financial deregulation affected enrollments.
Credit constraints have drawn considerable attention in the education literature. However, so far no consensus has been reached regarding the empirical importance of credit constraints on college enrollment. Controlling for ability proxied by Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) find a positive but small relationship between family income and college attendance using NLSY 1979 data. They attribute the effect of income on college attendance largely to early life educational resource disadvantages as opposed to credit constraints. Keane and Wolpin (2001) also find a small impact of credit constraints on college attendance, using the same NLSY 1979 data. Relatedly, Cameron and Taber (2004) infer college borrowing constraints using information on returns to schooling and find little efficiency loss in the market for schooling. On the other hand, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) exploit changes in the distribution of income from the 1970s to 1990s and find a substantial effect of family income on college enrollment. Similar to Carneiro and Heckman (2002) , Lochner and Belley (2007) use the 1997 cohort of the NLSY and find the effect of family income on college has been increasing over time in the United States. Using the Current Population Survey, Christian (2006) finds that college enrollment from households expected to have lower incomes is significantly more procyclical than otherwise, confirming the theoretical prediction by earlier work such as Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) , providing suggestive evidence that liquidity constraints may have played a role in U.S. college enrollment patterns. Dynarski (2002) summarizes several works that identify the effects of lowering schooling costs through subsidies and concludes that aid does appear to affect schooling decisions, with the best estimate suggesting that eligibility for $1,000 of subsidy increases college attendance rates by roughly 4 percentage points. Mazumder (2003) exploits the rich wealth and asset information from the SIPP (Survey of Income and Program Participation) and provides additional evidence that college enrollment 14 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS is particularly sensitive to income for families with modest amounts of wealth. More recently, using Massachusetts data, Goodman (2010) finds evidence of credit constraints on college enrollment after controlling for academic skill and quality of school. Lovenheim (2011) uses fluctuations in housing prices in the 2000s and finds a significant effect of housing wealth fluctuations on college enrollment. 5 He notes that his results could be potentially confounded by an increase in household wealth leading to more consumption, including college education, and calls for further work on separating this and the credit constraints effects. Our research design is different from previous works in that the exogenous variation we exploit does not involve changes in family income or housing wealth; thus, our estimates are much less subject to the wealth effects concern. Our results add further evidence that the credit constraints channel has played an important role in determining households' college enrollment decisions in the United States.
This paper joins a growing body of work, mainly in the finance literature, that evaluates the impact of banking deregulation on economic development (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996; Huang, 2008) , entrepreneurship formation (Black & Strahan, 2002; Kerr & Nanda, 2009) , state business cycles (Morgan, Rime, & Strahan, 2003; Hoffman & Shcherbakova-Stewen, 2011; Demyanyk, Ostergaard, & Sørensen, 2007) , income distribution (Beck, Levine, & Levkov, 2010) , neighborhood crime rates (Garmaise & Moskovitz, 2006) , rent sharing and discrimination in the banking industry (Black & Strahan, 2001) , and personal bankruptcy rates (Dick & Lehnert, 2010) . Levine and Rubinstein (2014) also examine the effect of banking deregulation on educational choices, focusing on the relationship between ability and education investments.
In section VD, we provide strong evidence that the channel through which the reform affected college enrollment was the relaxation of credit constraints and rule out alternative explanations. It is useful to emphasize that independent of the interpretations of the causal effect of banking deregulation on household college attendance, this is an important policy parameter in and of itself. Our estimates imply that the banking deregulation across states in the United States had a positive effect on college enrollment through an increase in available credit to households and could have positive longterm effects on human capital accumulation and regional development in the United States, apart from the effects identified in the existing banking literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides regulatory background on banking deregulation and justifies the validity of using this policy reform. We also discuss the related theoretical perspective on the college attendance decision. Section III explains our research design and empirical model. Section IV describes our data set. Section V presents and discusses the main results of our paper. We first provide direct evidence that deregulation lowered the cost of household mortgage financing and increased the proportion of students taking up college loans. We then show that banking regulation had a significant effect on individual enrollment decisions, as well as college completion outcomes. This section also discusses evidence pointing to the credit constraints interpretation. Section VI presents robustness checks, and section VII concludes and offers suggestions for future research.
II. Institutional and Theoretical Background

A. Institutional Background on Bank Deregulation
Most U.S. states historically restricted banks from expanding geographically within and across state borders, which dates back to colonial times (Kroszner & Strahan, 2001) . Only twelve states deregulated intrastate bank branching, and no state allowed interstate bank expansion before the wave of deregulation that began in the 1970s. The historical restriction on banking favored small and poorly capitalized banks over large and well-capitalized banks as it gave local banks monopoly power, which they used to extract economic rent. 6 As Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) showed, states did not deregulate their banks in anticipation of future growth prospects. Krozner and Strahan (1999) provide further analysis of the economic and political reasons for the exact timing of state deregulations.
Beginning in the early 1970s, states lifted restrictions on banks' geographic expansion. They typically deregulated intrastate banking first and then moved to deregulate interstate banking. Several studies have found significant effects of deregulation on market structure in local banking markets; for example, Amel and Liang (1992) show that the number of new entrants increased, and Calem (1994) , as well as McLaughlin (1995) , show that existing banks consolidated. All states except for Arkansas, Iowa, and Minnesota had lifted intrastate branching restrictions before the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.
We choose the date of intrastate deregulation as the date on which a state permitted branching via mergers and acquisitions (M&A) through the holding company structure, the first step in the deregulation process, followed by de novo branching (i.e., allowing a bank holding company to establish a new branch in a different geographical area). 7 Figure  1 shows the spread of intrastate bank branching deregulation allowing branching via merger and acquisition (M&A) between 1972 and 1992. 
B. Effects of Bank Deregulation on Household Credit
The lifting of state branching laws would have directly affected the price of credit for families with college-age children. Knapp and Seaks (1992) mention that a direct private student loan market was practically nonexistent during the time period in question due to the high risk. However, many students borrowed indirectly from banks via their parents. Students' parents typically have assets to use as collateral, and these loans were consequently less risky investments for banks. During the time period in question, various sources estimate that between 10% and 20% of families took on private loans to help finance college costs. Government student loans were available to both parents and students throughout the period in question; however, they were capped, requiring some families to borrow on the private market. 8 Some families with good credit scores may also have received lower interest rates in the private loan market. 9 The bulk of private loans for college financing were through signature loans, home equity loans, lines of credit, or loans against life insurance policies.
Given that the rollback of state branching regulation increased competition between banks and lowered the costs of private loans, branching deregulation would have made college more affordable for many families. Dick and Lehnert (2010) find that banks in general allowed previously excluded households to enter the market and increased overall personal borrowing, including credit card loans. Indirect evidence of lower costs resulting from increased competition also exists; for example, Black and Strahan (2001) find that wages fell for bank employees following deregulation. Savings may have been passed on to consumers. In section VA, we provide evidence consistent with the findings in the finance literature that total loan volume increases, bank fees decrease, and mortgage loan interest rates decrease following branching deregulation taking effect. We also provide direct evidence from household longitudinal surveys that households borrowed more to finance education following the lifting of branching restrictions.
C. Theoretical Background
Two theoretical perspectives are typically presented when interpreting the relation of family financial wealth and education choice. These two views are not mutually exclusive. One perspective treats college education purely as an investmentgood in the lens of human capital investment models, as in Becker (1962) . This branch of models predicts that one invests in college if and only if the rate of return from attending college is greater than or equal to the market rate of return from investing the forgone earnings and the direct cost of college. Under the investment-good perspective, there could exist two major channels through which a state's deregulation policy can lead to an increase in college enrollment. The first is a credit constraint channel: a state's deregulation could lead to a lower interest rate for borrowing; at the same time, banks could begin lending money to those previously excluded from the credit market. The second is a returns-to-education channel: if a state's deregulation policy leads to an increase in the college wage premium, as Larrain (2012) showed, we might observe that households in states that deregulate their banking sector are more 16 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS likely to send children to college. This could happen even in a frictionless market where households do not face borrowing constraints. In our main regression, we include the state-level college wage premium as a control for the returnsto-education channel. In section VD, we present substantial evidence consistent with a credit-constraints interpretation, while not lending support to the returns-to-education interpretation. It is important to note that given our previous argument that the state deregulates its banking sector regardless of future economic prospects, our empirical exercise estimates a causal impact of the state deregulation on a household's college enrollment decision. This is an important policy issue in its own right given discussion on the effect of banking competition on issues as diverse as local crime rates in Garmaise and Moskovitz (2006) and credit supply to poor income groups as in Melzer (2011) .
An alternative perspective treats college education as a consumption good (e.g., Lazear, 1979) . In this case, college enrollment increases due to wealth effects. As Lovenheim (2011) pointed out, many earlier empirical papers faced a challenge in evaluating the credit constraints channel by examining the relationship between family income or housing wealth and the college enrollment decision. If college attendance is a consumption good, then an increase in family income or housing wealth will lead the household to consume more of all goods, including college education. We are able to deal with this challenge, as the ability to borrow more from credit markets adds to a household's debt liability while not changing net family wealth.
Our research design is novel in comparison to existing studies: the effect that we identify comes predominantly from a change in prices rather than an accompanied change in wealth due to changes in family income or housing wealth. 10 Previous studies have examined changes in family income or housing wealth, and these changes naturally involve wealth effects, in addition to price effects, in the estimates. Our identified change in the college enrollment decision comes predominantly from changes in prices, and much less from changes in wealth. To the extent that changes in price automatically introduce both income and substitution effects, we cannot separately identify the income effect from the substitution effect unless strong assumptions about family preferences are imposed. 11 We also note that even though we control for common measures that relate to household wealth, such as family income and housing wealth, which account for over 60% of U.S. household wealth, we are not able to obtain a complete measure of household wealth in our data set. Therefore, we cannot completely rule 10 It is illustrative to regard Y it , household college education decision, as a function of P it , the relative prices of education and other goods, and W it , family wealth: Lovenheim (2011) discusses how an increase in housing wealth could bring down the average interest rate a family has to pay for loan, while an increase in household income could lead to lower mortgage rates (see Mian & Sufi, 2009). out that even conditional on household income and housing wealth, banking deregulation may have increased other unobservable items comprising household wealth, such as stock and bond investments and ownership of a small business. However, U.S. households' ownership of stock and bond investments is diversified at the national level and thus less likely to be affected by own state economic condition, and only a small proportion of households own a small business.
III. Empirical Methodology
A. Empirical Model
The principal challenge for researchers aiming to estimate the effects of financial constraints on college enrollment is the fact that financial resources are nonrandomly assigned across households. Children from high-income households may be endowed with greater abilities and enjoy better educational resources in early childhood, and hence will be more likely to attend college. Other factors correlated with access to credit, such as a history of personal bankruptcy, may also be correlated with family background, which will affect college enrollment decisions. We can circumvent this difficulty by exploiting exogenous changes in state financial regulations that had the effect of increasing credit available to households. These policies would have relaxed credit constraints for individuals living in a state where deregulation took place.
We use the dates of legislative changes to construct an indicator variable equal to 1 for states permitting M&A branching and 0 otherwise. We restrict the sample to individuals who are of typical college-going age, which we define as 17 to 23, between 1972 and 1992, during which the vast majority of states went from restricting to permitting M&A branching. 12 We also restrict the sample to individuals who completed middle school. 13 We estimate the effects of relaxing credit constraints on college enrollment with the following linear probability model:
where Y ist is our object of interest, an indicator of whether individual i from state s has attended college or university at time t, and Z st is an indicator of whether a state has deregulated the banking sector. We include year fixed effects η t to absorb any economy-wide temporal shocks and state fixed effects α s to control for any time invariant state-specific factors in college enrollment. We further include a state-specific time trend in our baseline specifications to guard against concerns from an increasing college-going rate over time. We 12 The results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks and altering our definition of college age, the years included, and our definition of being enrolled in college. 13 We view dropping out of middle or high school as indicative of problems such as learning disabilities or adverse family shocks that would make college enrollment difficult regardless of credit constraints. The results are robust to the exclusion of high school dropouts. also include X it , a vector of individual controls, including gender, race, parents' marital status, household income, and home value, as well as W st , a vector of state-level controls including state unemployment rate, median state income, state population, and state-level college wage premium. Our main coefficient of interest is β, which measures the increase in college enrollment stemming from relaxing credit constraints by lifting branching restrictions. The specification is a generalization of the difference-in-differences approach where the effect of deregulation is estimated as the difference in college enrollment before and after deregulation, with the difference in enrollment from a control group that did not experience financial deregulation. We estimate the specification using OLS to avoid the incidental parameters problem using logit or probit models. To deal with the potential serial correlation in the error term, we adopt the recommended approach in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and use a bootstrap to calculate standard errors. 14 They demonstrate, using Monte Carlo simulation, that block bootstrap performs well when the number of states is large (50 in their case).
B. Identification
Our source of identifying variation is the passage of state laws deregulating bank branching, which relaxed credit constraints for families. This state-level deregulation was driven by exogenous differences in the timing of the adoption of branching deregulation laws, not by an anticipation of future good growth prospects. Following Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , a large body of research has emerged that uses the exogenous variation in state banking deregulation we reviewed earlier. A particular advantage of our research design is that statewide deregulation is uncorrelated with individual-level characteristics that may be determinants of college enrollment. If there were unobserved determinants of college enrollment correlated with our identifying source of variation, our estimates would be biased. Controlling for geographic and temporal factors in college enrollment using state and year fixed effects allows us to compare individuals with similar observable characteristics who were affected by exogenous changes in credit supply from bank branching deregulation.
We control for state-level labor market conditions by including state-level unemployment rates, real income per capita, the size of the college-going population in the state, and the state college wage premium. We wish to draw special attention to the state college wage premium control. One of the most significant concerns in regard to our interpretation of the main results is that the observed effects of branching deregulation are due to changes in the college wage premium rather than driven by the credit constraint channel. Businesses may have taken advantage of banking deregulation to invest in new technologies, which could have driven up the 14 We also cluster standard errors at the state level as a robustness check.
wage premium for a college education. Unconstrained individuals would then respond by increasing enrollment rates. We can control for changes in the distribution of the college wage premium directly.
Our identifying assumption is that the specific timing of state banking deregulation is conditionally uncorrelated with unobserved factors that affect the individual college enrollment decision. In section IIA, we presented institutional details documented by the banking literature on the political economy of banking deregulation that supports this assumption. Several empirical exercises in section VC also test and refute any pretrend in college enrollment and simultaneous banking deregulation, adding to the validity of our identifying assumptions. We are able to identify the average treatment effect (ATE) brought about by banking deregulation. Specifically, two groups of households are affected: one group could not borrow enough to go to college without the deregulation, and the other group chose not to borrow to go to college at the then relatively high interest rate, but switched to borrow to fund college education once given access to credit at a lower price after the deregulation. Broadly speaking, these two groups of households are all facing a decrease in prices of debt: the price of a loan in the first case goes from infinity to some finite number. 15
IV. Data
Our main source of individual-level data is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a nationally representative sample of households that began in 1968 and has followed individuals and their descendants annually since that time and biannually after 1997. The PSID crucially contains data on educational attainment and state of residence, as well as rich demographic controls, including family income and home value, which we take as a proxy for wealth. 16 An individual is defined as having been enrolled in college or a university if he or she completed more than twelve grades of schooling.
We obtain a second source of individual data in the NLSY 79, a nationally representative survey of American youths between the ages of 14 and 22 in 1979. The NLSY data are valuable to us for two reasons. First, the data validate our main findings from the PSID. Second, the NLSY includes data on whether families took out loans to finance educational expenses. Thus, the NLSY allows us to provide direct evidence that lifting the branching restrictions was associated with an increase in obtaining educational loans. Crucially, we obtained the NLSY restricted-access geocode, which allowed us to determine whether the branching restrictions were in effect for an individual in a given 15 While the term credit constraints may appear to correspond to the first group of households, these two groups of households are all referred to as being credit constrained in the literature (see Cameron & Taber, 2004, and Lovenheim, 2011) . 16 The PSID did not begin collecting detailed data on wealth until 1985. Unfortunately this period is after the vast majority of states deregulated. year. The primary drawback of the NLSY comes from statistical power. There is variation in unit banking laws from 1972 until 1996, whereas the NLSY begins in 1979, and by 1989 most individuals had made their college enrollment decisions. We present summary statistics for key variables in both PSID and NLSY 79 data in table 1.
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We also obtain measurement of aggregate college enrollment at the state level using the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) data to illustrate that the general picture indeed holds true. The NCES data comprise all undergraduate students enrolled full time in a degreegranting postsecondary institution between 1970 and 1996. Full-time enrollment is measured in the fall of each academic year and includes undergraduate students enrolled full time in institutions that grant associate or higher degrees and participate in Title IV programs.
Our state-level controls are drawn from various sources. We obtain per capita income for each state from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and adjust for inflation using the CPI-U. State-level unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics compilation. The size of the state's college-age population, collected from U.S. Census Bureau population estimates, is defined as individuals 18 to 22 years old. We also use data on the state-level college-high school wage gap from Fortin (2009) as a proxy for the college wage premium, which started in 1979 and was generated from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey (CPS). 17 We collect several data sets pertaining to the effect of banking deregulation on real interest rates and personal loans. First, we obtain information on whether state laws permitting M&A and de novo branching are in effect from Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Strahan (2003) . Average interest rates and bank fees at the state level for mortgage loans are obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Agency's Monthly Survey of Rates and Terms on Conventional Single Family Non-Farm Mortgage Loans. We obtain 17 Our main results are also robust to using the wage gap five years after enrollment, which we view as a proxy for college students' rational expectation of the wage gap after graduation. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. The dependent variables in columns 1 and 2 are, respectively, the logarithm of average mortgage loan interest rates and fees by state. In column 3, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the total volume of personal loans for individual bank branches. The mean of log interest rates is 2.12, the mean log of fees is .062, and the mean log of personal loans is 8.21. All specifications are a linear probability model and include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are computed using bootstrap. Average interest rates and bank fees at the state level for mortgage loans are obtained from the data on the volume of personal loans from the Federal Reserve Reports of Condition and Income. We obtain data on state-level college enrollment from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
V. Results
Here we present the results of our empirical exercise. In section VA, we present indirect evidence on increased credit supply from banking deregulation by examining changes in the mortgage loan interest rate, bank fees, and the volume of private loans. We provide further direct evidence in section VB by showing that household educational borrowing for college increased following the deregulation. The main results are shown in section VC. We find the financial deregulation led to a 2.6 percentage point increase in the college enrollment rate during our sample period. We provide substantial evidence supporting the credit constraints interpretation in section VD. Table 2 presents evidence of the effects of branching deregulation on private loans. We separately regress interest rates, mortgage loan fees, and total private loan volume on an indicator equal to 1 if bank branching deregulation is in effect. Consistent with increased competition leading to lower prices and higher quantities, we find that total private loan volume increases, bank fees decrease, and mortgage loan interest rates decrease after branching deregulation takes effect.
A. Effects on Household Credit Availability
The evidence presented in table 2 is consistent with both Dick and Lehnert (2010) and Black and Strahan (2002) . Dick and Lehnert (2010) find that banks allowed previously excluded households to enter the market by increasing overall personal borrowing, including credit card loans, and reducing the cost of credit as a result of the branching deregulation. Black and Strahan (2002) show that banking deregulation increased the rate of entrepreneurship in a state, which is well known to depend crucially on bank lending. They provide indirect evidence that deregulation *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. All specifications are a linear probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual took out educational loans to finance college. The sample consists of individuals in the NLSY 79 data set between the ages of 17 and 23. We add state and year fixed effects, demographic controls and state unemployment rate, median income, and population sequentially across specifications for either M&A or De Novo branching deregulation. Standard errors are computed using bootstrap.
led to increased credit supply, even though data on lending to small and young firms over a relatively long span of time are not available. The increasing loan volumes, decreasing interest rates, and bank fees that came about as a result of branch deregulation relaxed credit constraints for families with college-age children. We can thus exploit the variation resulting from lifting state branching prohibitions to determine whether credit constraints affected college enrollment.
B. Are Individuals Taking Out More Loans to Finance
College? Table 3 provides direct evidence that financial deregulation increased the fraction of individuals taking loans to finance college. Each column presents the result of a linear probability model, where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual took out loans to finance postsecondary study. We are able to obtain this information from questionnaires in NLSY 79. The results indicate that the deregulation caused a 4 percentage point increase in families taking out loans to finance their children's university studies. The observed effect is robust to including both individual demographic controls and state economic controls. The effect is similar for both branching via merger and acquisition and de novo branching. In all specifications, the effect is significant at the .01 level for lifting the M&A branching restrictions. While the coefficient is similar for allowing de novo branching, the effect is much less precisely estimated, being significant only at the .1 level. This is likely due to the fact that we have less variation in de novo branching laws in the NLSY sample. The individuals sampled in the NLSY were between ages 14 and 22 in 1979, and thus we can exploit variation in branching laws only from the early 1980s, when the majority of the young adults sampled in the NLSY were making enrollment decisions. Regardless, states' allowing both types of branching significantly increased the share of families taking educational loans.
C. Results on College Enrollment and Completion
Columns 1 and 2 in panel A of table 4 present the results of a linear probability model using the PSID data, with the dependent variable being an indicator of whether an individual attended college between the ages of 17 and 23. Our main variable of interest is an indicator of whether a state has lifted branching regulations. We find evidence that state branching deregulation, and the subsequent increase in credit supply, increases college enrollment. When branching regulations are lifted, the probability of college enrollment increases by roughly 2.6 percentage points. In our sample, average college enrollment is 53 percentage points, and thus the increase in enrollment probability represents a 4.9% increase in enrollment resulting from relaxing credit constraints via branching deregulation. 18 The magnitude of this increase accounts for a quarter of the total 10 percentage point increase in college enrollments between 1972 and 1992. Our results are significantly different from 0 at the .01 level in all specifications and robust to controlling for demographics and family background.
It is worth noting that our point estimate on the college enrollment decision is smaller than the effect we see in section VB on whether families borrowed to finance college enrollment, suggesting that either many unconstrained families borrowed to increase consumption or completion rates increased due to credit availability. 19 NCES data indicate that in 1982, 18.1% of families took nonfederal, nonstate, or noninstitutional loans to finance college, with 5.1% of families borrowing more than $2,000. Choy et al. (1992) document that in 1987, 11% of student parents took nonfederal, nonstate, or noninstitutional loans such as signature loans, home equity loans, lines of credit, or loans against life insurance policies. 20 Stiglitz et al. (2000) note that in 1993, 7% of families took out a second mortgage to finance college. As a magnitude check, it is useful to compare the rates of families that took out private student loans to the results of this study on college enrollment, namely, that enrollment increased by 4.9% following financial deregulation. If between 10% and 20% of families took on private loans for college, between 18 Mortgage loan interest rates declined by approximately 9% following branching deregulation. We see that college enrollment increased by roughly 2.6 percentage points following branching deregulation, suggesting that a 1% decline in interest rates leads to an approximate .3 percentage point increase in college enrollment. We note that branching deregulation could have affected credit limits and supply, as well as interest rates, making this an upper bound for the effect of interest rates on college enrollment.
19 See Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) for a discussion of credit constraints and college dropout decisions. 20 The decrease in private loan borrowing between 1982 and 1987 may have been due to increases of subsidized government student loan caps in 1987. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. In all specifications, the dependent variable is listed above the specification. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual enrolled in college. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual has completed at least two year of college. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual ever completes four years of college. The sample consists of individuals between the ages of 17 and 23 in the PSID in panel A and NLSY 79 in panel B. All specifications include state and year fixed effects, a state-specific linear trend, as well as household demographic controls listed above and state-level controls including state unemployment rate, median income, population, and college wage premium. Standard errors are computed using bootstrap.
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20% and 40% of the families taking these loans were constrained, and their students would have been unable to attend otherwise.
We also examine alternative outcomes of postsecondary attainment and find the effects of banking deregulation to be similar. Columns 3 and 4 in table 4 show results where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual has completed at least two years of college. The results are quite similar to those for enrollment presented in columns 3 and 4 and statistically indistinguishable. Columns 5 and 6 in table 4 present results in which the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual ever completes four years of college. When all controls are included, the point estimate on college completion is slightly smaller than the coefficient on enrollment. This may suggest that the effect on completion is smaller than the effect on enrollment; however, the difference between the estimates is small in magnitude and not significant. Given that individuals have a probability of completion that is less than 1, the fact that the coefficients do not differ substantially could suggest that the relaxation of credit constraints could have affected inframarginal students who might have dropped out due to credit constraints.
Our results from the PSID are confirmed by analogous analysis using data from the NLSY 79, shown in panel B of table 4. Our specifications were altered slightly because the marital status of parents and home value were not available in all years of the NLSY. Again, the results paint a similar picture for the effects of banking deregulation on college enrollment as the PSID sample. The results are significantly different from 0 at the .05 level when we add the full controls for college enrollment, at least two-year college completion, and four-year college completion. The notable difference with the PSID is the slightly larger and less precisely estimated results, which could be due to the fact that in the NLSY, we have fewer years of data and consequently less variation in branching laws.
To further investigate the dynamic effect of the banking deregulation on college enrollment, as well as provide additional support for our identification strategy, we estimate a model similar to our main regression except that we replace the treatment dummy with a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years before and after each state's banking deregulation and omit the first year of deregulation as the base year. The point estimate as well as the confidence band at the 95% level for each of these year-specific treatment effects ranging from ten years before and after the deregulation are plotted in figure 2. Findings from this empirical exercise show that our main results are not driven by a predetermined trend that coincides with the specific timing of state banking deregulation and changes in college enrollment. Apart from our previous argument using the political economy of the exogeneity of state banking deregulation and college enrollment, our results further strengthen this identifying assumption. Figure 2 also illustrates that the effect from banking deregulation is quite persistent over time.
We also use another data source containing aggregated data on college student enrollment to examine the pattern of college enrollment at the state level. Table 5 presents similar results at the state level using the aggregated NCES data. The dependent variable is the total state college enrollment. The results indicate that lifting state branching regulations increases college enrollment by between roughly 9,000 and 16,000. The state-level NCES data indicate that the rollback of M&A branching restrictions increases college enrollment 
-Treatment Effect over Time
The solid black line plots the coefficient βy from the specification Yist = ηt + αs + 10 y=−10 βy1y=t × Zst + γ1Xit + γ2Wst + ist . The outcome variable Yist is an indicator of whether an individual i has enrolled in college in time period t. Zst is an indicator of whether a state has lifted restrictions on branching. We include year fixed effects αt to absorb any economy-wide temporal shocks and state fixed effects αs to control for any state-specific factors in college enrollment. We also include Xit and Wst ; they are controls including gender, race, parents' marital status, household income, home value, state unemployment rate, median state income, state population, and state-level college wage premium. Standard errors are clustered at the state by year level. A 95% confidence interval is plotted in dotted lines. by 8.8%. We regard the results from the state aggregate data as an illustration of the general picture, consistent with our preferred individual results.
Overall, our results indicate that states' lifting restrictions on state branching increased higher education enrollment among college-age individuals. At the same time, borrowing costs were significantly reduced for families through lower interest rates and bank fees brought about by deregulation. Since this would have reduced the costs of borrowing, the results are consistent with credit constraints affecting college enrollment. Further evidence of the channel through which branch deregulation affected college enrollment is provided by the lack of any observable effect for groups that were not affected by credit constraints.
D. Evidence for the Credit Constraints Interpretation
One significant concern for the validity of our results is that the observed effects are due not to relaxing credit constraints but rather to rational expectations resulting from changes in economic growth following branch deregulation. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) found that growth rates increased following the lifting of state branching prohibitions. In our main regression, we include the state-level college wage premium to control for the returns-to-education channel. To investigate the issue further, we conduct some heterogeneity analyses. In particular, we show that we do not observe any increase in college enrollment for groups whose credit constraints were not relaxed by branching deregulation. We argue that this is consistent with relaxing credit constraints as the main channel through which financial deregulation affected college enrollment.
Columns 1 to 4 of table 6 present a linear probability model with the dependent variable being an indicator of whether a college-age individual is enrolled in postsecondary education on a branching indicator and controls, broken down by income quartiles determined from a nationally representative sample using PSID sample weights. 21 The results provide suggestive evidence that our earlier results are driven by poor and middle-class families. The largest observed effect comes from the second income quartile. Branching deregulation increases the probability of enrollment by 4.57 percentage points. The coefficient is statistically different from zero at the .05 level. The average rate of college enrollment for this group in our sample is 43.2 percent, indicating that college enrollment increased by 10.6% following branching deregulation. This result is unsurprising, as individuals in the second income quartile are the group most likely to be able to benefit from access to credit. This group is relatively low income, and hence paying for college directly may be unaffordable. However individuals in the second quartile are likely to have assets which can be used as collateral to access credit markets. The results are of smaller magnitude for the first income quartiles, with lifting branching restrictions increasing the probability of enrollment by 3.11 percentage points, again the results are significant at 0.05 level. We find the effects are not significant for the third income quartile, but the magnitude is worth noting, at 2.55 percentage points. Given the standard error, we are not able to distinguish the effects of banking deregulation among these income quartiles. These groups would have also been constrained by access to credit, so the increase in credit supply resulting from lifting branching regulations would have made college more accessible for these groups. For the top income quartile, the coefficient is positive but of much smaller magnitude than the other quartiles, and moreover the effect of branching deregulation on college enrollment is not significant at the 10 percent level. For individuals in the highest income quartile, branching deregulation is associated with a merely 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability of college enrollment, translating into a 1.39% increase, compared with 10.6% increase for the second income quartile. The results indicate that the effect can not be distinguished from zero, even if there is some effect, the economic magnitude is quite small.
We can use the PSID to construct another group of individuals who faced significant credit constraints both before and after states lifted branching regulations. Individuals who have gone through bankruptcy face great difficulty in accessing credit markets, and this would have remained true both 22 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. All specifications are a linear probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual is enrolled in college. Families are broken into income quartiles using nationally representative sample weights. All specifications include controls for female, race, marital status of parents, household income, home value, state income, state unemployment rate, population, state-specific college wage premium, as well as state and year fixed effects and a state-specific linear trend. Standard errors are computed using bootstrap. before and after banking deregulation. 22 Column 5 of table 6 presents the results of a linear probability model with the dependent variable being college-enrollment, restricted to individuals whose parents had declared bankruptcy at the time of their college-going age. Consistent with the effect of branching deregulation on college enrollment being through credit constraints, we find no effect of lifting branch regulations on college enrollment for individuals whose parents went through bankruptcy. We also examine the effects on families that have not been bankrupt in column 6 of table 6 and find the results are similar to that using full sample.
The results from the group of individuals whose parents declared bankruptcy are important in distinguishing the role of access to credit in explaining the observed increase in college enrollments, although the sample size is admittedly small. An alternative explanation for our results is that businesses borrowed and invested more following the repeal of unit branching laws and that these investments increased the returns to education differentially for low-income individuals. If this were the causal mechanism behind the increase in enrollment and indeed individuals were not credit constrained, we would expect to see an increase in college enrollments for individuals whose parents had declared bankruptcy. This is not the case.
To sum up our results, table 3 provides evidence from the NLSY 79 that families increased borrowing to finance educational expenses following the repeal of unit branching restrictions. Table 4 indicates that the lifting of state branching restrictions was accompanied by 2.6 percentage points increase in college enrollments. The general pattern is confirmed in table 5 using an aggregate state level data set. The results in table 6 indicate that our baseline results are driven by lower-and middle-income families, whose college enrollment choices would have been most affected by credit constraints. Furthermore, we find insignificant and close to 0 in magnitude effects for upper-income families who presumably had the financial resources to send their children to college both before and after the lifting of branching restrictions. We also find no effects for a placebo group of individuals whose families had undergone bankruptcy, and thus who would have been excluded from credit markets both before and after deregulation. We view the sum of this 22 In 1996 the PSID asked individuals if they have ever declared bankruptcy, as well as the year of their previous two bankruptcies. evidence as being strongly in favor of the effect of branching deregulation operating through the credit constraint channel. Table 7 presents a number of robustness and sensitivity checks to confirm the robustness of our main results on college enrollment. In the results of table 4, we restrict the sample to individuals who completed middle school, viewing earlier dropouts as unlikely to have the opportunity to enroll in college. The first two columns of table 7 restrict the sample to individuals who completed at least one year of high school and completed high school, respectively. In both cases, the results remain qualitatively similar. The magnitude of the results for high school completers increases as the conditional probability of college enrollment for this group is larger. In the main results, we also define college age as between 17 and 23 while the age range has been changed to 17 to 22 in the first two columns of table 7. 23 In column 3 we change the age range to individuals between the ages of 18 and 21. We also examine the age bracket 16 to 22 years in column 4. The results suggest that our estimates are not driven by a specific choice of the age range.
VI. Robustness
The key identifying assumption for our difference-indifferences empirical design is the common trends across states in the factors affecting college enrollment decisions. Previous studies using state compulsory schoolings laws as instruments rely on a similar common trends assumption for factors affecting different birth cohorts. Recently Stephens and Yang (2014) study several of these prior works and find that the results are not robust to allowing the year-ofbirth effects to vary across regions. Specifically, they add extra controls for the four U.S. Census regions by year fixed effects. As a robustness check, we allow flexibly for the college-going trend to vary unconditionally by the four U.S. regions, as in Stephens and Yang (2014) . We regard this as a stress test, on top of our main specifications, which already control for a state-specific linear time trend. Results from column 5 show that our results remain robust, significant at the 5% level.
In column 6, we present results dropping observations in Delaware and South Dakota, as is common in several prior studies (e.g., Black & Strahan, 2002) . Delaware and South Dakota passed laws to attract financial corporations to their 23 The results are robust to using the age range 17 to 23. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. All specifications are a linear probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether an individual is enrolled in college. The sample consists of individuals in the PSID between ages 17 and 23 unless noted otherwise. All specifications include controls for female, race, marital status of parents, household income, home value, state income, state unemployment rate, population, state-specific college wage premium, as well as state and year fixed effects and a state-specific linear trend, unless noted otherwise. Standard errors are computed using bootstrap, unless noted otherwise. Column 1 restricts the sample to individuals who had begun high school, and column 2 restricts the sample to individuals who finished high school. We define college-going age to be 18 to 21 in column 3 and 16 to 22 in column 4, respectively. Column 5 includes four census region-by-year dummies. We dropped observations in Delaware and South Dakota in column 6. Column 7 restricts the sample to years following 1976, the conclusion of Vietnam War. In column 8, we cluster the standard errors at the state level. We drop the state-specific linear trend in column 9. In column 10, we restrict the sample to individuals who are 19 years old.
states more or less at the time that branching deregulation came into effect. Dropping these states has no material effects on our results. We also restrict the sample to years following 1976 and the conclusion of the Vietnam War. In the United States many individuals enrolled in college to avoid conscription during the Vietnam War era, and this could potentially confound our results. Column 7 presents the results when years before 1976 are dropped. When we drop the Vietnam War years from our sample, the results are again quite similar to the main specifications. In column 8 of table 7, we cluster at the state level in calculating the standard errors to allow for potential serial correlation within a state. Our results are significant at the 5% level, suggesting that this is not a major concern for our results. We drop the state-specific linear trend in our main specifications in column 9, and there is no significant effect on our estimates. Finally, column 10 restricts that sample to individuals who are 19 years old, providing another check that statistical significance is not driven by correlated standard errors between individuals or families in the panel data. The coefficient is significant at the .01 level and similar in magnitude to our main results.
VII. Conclusion
Classical human capital investment theory predicts that investment in college education should be independent of a family's financial resources, absent credit constraints or wealth effects. Whether credit constraints exist and how they affect a household's college enrollment decision in the United States turns out to be an empirical question. A large body of existing work has examined this issue, focusing on the role of family income or housing wealth fluctuations. Our work adds to this literature by examining the effect of an increase in commercial credit available to households, exploiting the exogeneous timing of states' lifting branching restrictions from the 1970s to 1990s. This research design allows us to produce estimates that are much less confounded by the wealth effects, thus providing clearly identified evidence that credit constraints affect college enrollment.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 79) we estimate that lifting intrastate branching restrictions increased college enrollment by roughly 4.9% out of an average 53 percentage points. This accounts for a quarter of the total increase in college enrollments between 1972 and 1992. The effect is largest for low-and middle-income families, while insignificant and close to 0 in magnitude for upper-income families. Furthermore, no significant effect is found for families who have gone through bankruptcy and hence would be unable to access credit markets. This evidence points to the relaxation of credit constraints as being the primary mechanism through which lifting intrastate branching regulations affected college enrollment.
These results are particularly relevant to policies on both promoting higher education enrollment and financial deregulation. While earlier research finds that the effect of credit constraints on college enrollment seems to be limited in the early 1980s, our analysis shows that an increase in credit supply promoted an increase in college enrollments from the 1970s to the 1990s. Our paper adds to the work of Beck et al. (2010) that shows financial deregulation leads to a tightening of the distribution of income. While Melzer (2011) finds some negative effects of providing credit to lowincome groups, our research finds that relieving the credit constraints of low-income households could increase college enrollment for this group. At the same time, the welfare effects of this increase in college enrollment are ambiguous because individuals must take on debt. Further research could estimate the returns to education for individuals most affected by credit constraints who chose to borrow to finance postsecondary studies. As student loan debt surpasses credit card debt as the main source of American households' debt burdens and tuition costs continue to rise, this becomes an especially timely question. Our work is admittedly indirect evidence about the effect of credit constraints on households' college decision. Future research is needed to exploit potential individual loan data matched with household information to corroborate our findings and evaluate the efficiency of the investment and the impact on intergenerational mobility.
